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ABSTRACT

Determinants of CEO Compensation in the Hospitality Industry

by

Yoonhwa Choi

Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Conunittee Chair
Associate Professor of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The issue of top management compensation has received widespread attention
from public concerns, stockholders, and regulating agencies for many years. Research on
top management compensation has taken place for more than 70 years. Recent popular
literature has criticized the compensation awarded to the Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) of large companies, claiming that pay is excessive and is not adequately linked to
firm performance. Hospitality industry is not an exception for such criticism. However,
little research on hospitality CEO compensation itself has been done.
This study empirically investigated whether CEO pay is linked to company
performance within the hospitality industry, and attempted to further identify
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. Thus, the present study adds to the body of
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knowledge on executive compensation for the hospitality industry by newly identifying
sector-specific variables.
The data was gathered for the years 1995-2000 for 22 hotels (SIC 7011), 25
casinos (SIC 7990), and 61 restaurants (SIC 5812) respectively. The final samples of the
restaurant, hotel and casino sectors consisted of 53, 77, and 188 observations
respectively.
This study found that the results of regression analysis at least partially support
agency theory in the hotel, casino and restaurant sectors by demonstrating that some
variables of ûrm performance are highly correlated with CEO compensation with the
high-adjusted R Square of .756, .727, and .697 respectively. The study's findings also
suggest that : (1) there is a strong relationship between firm size and CEO compensation;
(2) CEO compensation in the hotel and restaurant sectors demonstrates its high sensitivity
to a Arm's leverage condition; (3) hotel CEOs with high cash compensation are more
likely sales revenue than proAt-oriented; (4) there is an indicadon of agency problem in
the hotel sector by illustraüng that hotel Arms pay high compensaAon despite poor
market performance of their stocks.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study
Is CEO compensation linked to firm performance? The issue of top management
compensation is of key interest, not only to academic researchers, but also individuals
and entides including (for example) stockholders and regulating agencies, such as those
responsible for implementing new tax laws.
Pioneering work by Jensen and Meckhng (1976) suggests corporations should provide
compensation packages to attract and retain management talent, while simultaneously
balancing such compensaAon with expected increases in shareholder wealth resulting
from management performance. As long as execuAve pay is determined by performance
that increases shareholders' wealth, shareholders should jusAfy high execuAve pay.
RafGo (1997) reports that the industry's 100 highest paid leaders averaged an
impressive 60% increase in total compensaAon (cash and long-term rewards) of $1.5
nullion. In contrast, economists say most average workers wrangled no more than a 3-5
% pay hike during 1996, with foodservice at the low end of that range, hourly wages
creeping up an average of only 3.2%. Unit managers received salaries typically in the
$27000-$35000 range.
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Initially, corporations had been allowed to voluntarily disclose their own respective
(direct and indirect) forms of executive compensation. Publicly held companies are now
required, however, to file proxy statements with the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) in order to officially address the issue of alleged excessive CEO compensation.
These disclosures serve to give a potenhal investor enough information about a company
to determine what their making an investment in the company is worthwhile
(Romanchek, 1999). As a result of public outcry over CEO compensation, congress took
a significant step towards reforming execuAve pay in 1993. The government
implemented a new tax law, 162(m) stating that any cash paid to an executive in excess
of $1 million is non-tax deductible unless the salaries or bonuses are based on clearly
articulated performance goals (Romanchek, 1999; Dennis-EscofAer, 2001 ).
Some studies suggest, however, that CEO compensation is not always tied to a Arm's
performance. CEOs are paid well not only when their work yields posiAve results, but
indeed, even when they fail to achieve good results (Behr, 1997).
The principal-agent model of executive compensation suggests that by connecting pay
to performance, shareholders ensure corporate managers aAempt to maximize shareholder
wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). There are times, however, when respective interests
of shareholders and managers are incongruent. thus creating agency costs for
shareholders. Past research has aAempted to determine the opAmal conAact for both
pnncipal and agent, and has focused, to that end, on contractual relations between owners
and managers (Beatty & Zajac 1994; Eisenhardt 1989; Harris & Raviv 1979; Shavell
1979).
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Purpose of the Study
One key objective o f this study is to investigate whether CEO pay is linked to
company performance within the hospitality industry. This questionable link between
pay and performance is directly addressed by examining the relationship between Arm
performance and CEO cash compensation. Another objective of the study is to examine
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors.
The issue o f judging one accounting measure equally important across all Arms
regardless o f industry has already been identiAed as a weakness of previous studies (Duru
& Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier, 2000). This study, then, focuses on sector-speciAc
determinants across three sectors of the hospitality industry: hotel, casino, and restaurant.
Therefore, the issue is avoided by expanding variables with diverse aspects that may be
speciAcally related to CEO compensation across three separate sectors of the hospitality
industry.

Contributions of the Study
Potenhal conhibuAons o f the study are:
1. Despite numerous studies o f executive compensation conducted over the last
70 years, the review o f literature in the area o f execuAve compensation does
not indicate that pnor academic research has been done speciAcally for the
hospitality industry. Therefore, this study w ill both provide empincal
evidence and contribute to the body of research on the topic of executive
compensation for the comprehensive hospitality industry.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4

2. This study w ill help boards of directors and compensation consultants to
structure opAmal CEO compensation contracts by providing sector speciAcrelevant compensaAon determinants for each sector examined.
3. This study compensates for weakness in previous studies using only one
accounting measure across all firms, regardless of industry (Duru & Iyengar.
1999; Lobingier, 2000) by expanding the spectrum of variables o f Anancial
ratios. The present study also adds to the body of knowledge on execuAve
compensaAon for the hospitality industry by newly idenAfying sector-speciAc
variables.
4. This study expands the Ame Aame to six years. By using mulAple-year
observations (Attaway, 2000; Lobingier, 2000; Joyce, 2001) of sample Arms'
relevant accounting data Aom 1995 to 2000, the current study is expected to
provide a supenor gauge o f CEO performance, since multi-year observaAons
are less sensitive to transitory occurrences than are single-year observations
(Newman & Bannister, 1998: Mishra & Nielsen, 1999:Ueng, 2000).

LimitaAons of the Study
1. In this study, the sample is limited to publicly traded hotel, casino, and
restaurant Arms. Privately held companies are excluded due to lack of
available Anancial data.
2. ExecuAve compensation is limited to short-term pay, consisting o f cash
bonuses and salaries. This study does not use stock as a compensation
component, since AAeen percent o f the companies used in the sample failed to
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Ale copies of employee stock plans as exhibits of the Form 10-K annual
reports required by the SEC (Brown, 2000). Therefore, using stock
compensation would interfere with this study's overall accuracy. Another
reason for using cash compensaAon only is for easy comparability with
previous studies of different indusAies. Most earlier studies ( Agarwal. 1981 ;
Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970; Aggarwal & Samwick. 1999: Attaway. 2000 ;
Joyce, 2001) have also used cash compensaAon alone. This study does not
investigate deferred forms of compensaAon, either, such as stock options and
other long deferred compensaAon forms. Past studies (Lewellen & Huntsman,
1970) have determined cash compensation (salary plus bonus) an acceptable
substitute for more comprehensive measures o f compensation.
3. ExecuAve compensation examined for this study is that of CEOs only.
4. A limitation associated with this study is the accuracy o f the data because the
study has to rely on available secondary data.
5. Results of the study cannot be generalized across industries since the study
investigates only the hospitality industry.
6. CEO personal factors are not considered within this study. These include age,
job tenure, stock ownership, and education.
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DeAniAon of Terms
1. Regression Analysis: Regression analysis is a staAsAcai technique that can he used to
develop a mathematical equation showing how variables are related.
2. Dependent Variable: Dependent variable also called consequent variable or cnterion
variable. It is the vanable that is thought inAuenced by other variables.
3. Independent Variable: Independent variable is also called antecedent variable or
predictor variable. It is the variable thought to inAuence other vanables.
4. The R square o f the multiple correlaAon coefAcient (R^): R" is a Goodness-of-At
measure o f a linear model, sometimes called the coefAcient o f determination. It is the
proportion of variaAon in the dependent variable explained by the regression model.
It ranges in value Aom 0 to 1. Small values indicate that the model does not At the
data well.
5. The multiple correlation coefAcient (R ): R is a Pearson product-moment correlation
coefAcient between the cntenon variable and the predicted score on the critenon
variable.
6. Deferred compensation: This includes pension beneAts, deferred pay, stock options,
stock bonuses, IRAs, and proAt sharing.
7. Cash compensation: This is deAned as the sum of annual salary and bonus, all
measured in thousands of dollars (Rajagopalan & PrescoA, 1990)
8. Backward Elimination: This is variable selection procedure in which all vanables are
entered into the equation, and then sequentially removed. If it meets the cntenon for
elimination, it is removed. AAer the Arst vanable is removed, the remaining vanable
within the equation having the smallest partial correlation is next considered. The
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procedure ends when there are no further variables in the equation that satisfy
removal criteria.
9. Lodeine/Hotel industry: A group of firms deAned by SIC code 7011 as commercial
establishments engaged in providing lodging for the general public.
10. Casino industry: A group of Arms deAned by SIC code 7990 as commercial
establishments engaged in gaming.
11. Restaurant industry: A group of Arms deAned by SIC code 5812 as commercial
establishments primarily engaged in retail sales of prepared food and dnnks for on
premise or immediate consumption.
12. Liquidity rahos: Financial ratios used to indicate a firm's ability to meet short-term
Anancial obligations.
13. Leverage ratios: Financial ratios used to measure the extent to which a Arm relies on
borrowed funds.
14. ProAtability ratios: Financial ratios used to reAect a Arm's ability to cover costs and
provide returns to Arm owners.
15. EfAciency raAos: Financial ratios used to measure producAvity for a given level of
input.
16. Quick raAo (O R): This measures a Arm's liquidity, and may be obtained by dividing
quick assets by current liabilities.
17. Long term liabiliAes to total assets (L T D ): This is a leverage ratio, computed by
dividing long-term liabilities by total assets.
18. Net proAt margin (N P M ): This is a proAtability ratio obtainable by dividing net
proAt by net sales.
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s
19. Total asset turnover (A T T ): This is an efAciency ratio, computed by dividing net
sales by the average o f the current year's and the prior year's total assets.
20.

1 Year stock return (SR): This is a one-year percentage change in stock returns.

21. Return on assets (RO A): This means income before exAaordinary items available
for common, divided by total assets.
22. Return on investment (ROD: This is income before extraordinary items- available
for common, divided by total invested capital.
23.

1 Year sales growth rate (SG): This is one-year percentage change of total sales.

24. EB ITD A interest coverage (IC ): It is computed by dividing earnings before interest
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EB ITD A ) by interests.

Organization o f the Study
This study is designed to empirically investigate whether CEO pay is linked to
company performance within the hospitality industry, and to attempt to further identify
determinants of executive compensation among selected variables used in this study for
the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. Chapter 1 discusses the background of the study,
including its purpose, contributions, limitations, and provides a list o f deAnition of terms.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on CEO compensaAon. Chapter 3 discusses data,
variables, and research methodologies used in the study. Chapter 4 states Andings of the
empincal investigaAon and analyzes results. Chapter 5 discusses results and implicaAons
of the study, as well as providing suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

InAoducdon
Tremendous studies on executive compensaAon have been conducted over last 70
years. Chapter 2 w ill present extensive aspects of execuAve compensaAon that were
researched across industries by previous studies, including types of executive
compensaAon, agency theory, firm size as related to execuAve compensaAon,
compensaAon/ firm performance relaAonship, Anancial raAos used as proxies of Arm
performance, and execuAve compensaAon in the hospitality industry.

Types of CompensaAon
Short-term compensaAon
Short-term (or total cash) compensaAon is deAned as the sum of the annual salary and
bonus. Agarwal (1981) stated that the largest percentage of pnor studies have deAned
execuAve compensaAon to include orAy direct cash payments; thus cash compensation
has the advantage of providing comparability with other studies of execuAve
compensaAon. Also, Lewellen & Huntsman (1970) indicated that using salary and bonus
as a measure of executive compensaAon is an acceptable substitute for a more
comprehensive measure. To normalize this vanable and avoid biases caused by ouAiers,
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some previous studies have used the natural logarithm of CEO salary plus bonuses
(Attaway. 2000).
Long-term compensation
Long-term compensation includes a wide array o f deferred compensaAon beneAts. like
stock options, IRAs, bonus deferrals, pensions, and proAt sharing. (Gomez-Mejia. Tosi.
& Hinkin, 1987). Stock options can be used to augment salaries with a call option, so
that a CEO's total compensation pattern is more like that of a shareholder. M iller &
Scholes (1982) suggest stock options can be a more efAcient form of compensation.
Thus. CEO common stock is used to offset the incentive to manipulate annual earnings.
However, valuaAon of long-term incentives is beset with a number o f practical and
methodological issues (Kerr & BeAis, 1987; Finkelstein & Hambnck, 1989).

Agency Theory
The relationship predicted to exist between Arm performance and executive pay is
rooted in agency theory. Agency theory has been a major theoretical Aamework for
researching CEO compensation in numerous previous studies. Pnor empirical research
has generally focused on pay-perfbrmance sensiAvity, under the assumption that an
optimal CEO conAact should closely link pay to performance, since CEO behavior is
largely unobservable.
Baker. Jensen & Murphy (1988) discuss aspects of compensation using two distinct
approaches to viewing compensation: (1) Aaditional economic theory, and (2)
uneconomic theory. Typical explanations offered by psychologists, behaviorists, human
resource consultants, and personnel executives are distinctly uneconomic, that is.
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focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and
culture. Expectancy theoiy and determinants of organizational performance are examples
of uneconomic theory components. The major theoretical framework for researching
CEO pay derives Aom economics, however, and has been captured within the notion of
agency theory. The challenge to economists is to either provide viable economic
explanations for these pracAces or integrate alternative notions into the Aaditional
economic model.
According to agency theory, an agency problem exists when an agent, such as a CEO,
has established an agenda at odds with stockholder interests. Therefore, one way to avoid
agency problems in the short-run is to reward executives based on Anancial returns to
shareholders (Kerr & BetAs, 1989; Martocchio, 1998).
In terms of CEO compensation, the standard agency model (Holmstrom, 1979)
implies that a CEO o f sAonger ability has a greater reservation level of utility due to
favorable outside job opportunities and, thus, requires greater compensaAon. It is
expected that (to the extent CEO ability associates with Arm performance) CEO
compensation w ill vary according to CEO performance.
Agency theory posits that a conAact exists between agent (management) and pnncipal
(shareholder), and that actions by an agent may be best monitored through use of
incentives that link goals o f the agent to those o f the pnncipal. This theory also
emphasizes the idea that managers are self-serving; therefore, formal mechanisms, i.e.,
monitonng and reward structures, serve to align incentives of top managers with interests
of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama 1980; Jensen, 1983). The main
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objective o f boards of directors, then, should be to structure incentives so that an agent's
goal of increased personal wealth is not reached at the expense of shareholder wealth.
Much o f the conceptual literature based on an agency framework offers the argument
that principals have two options for reducing agency costs arising Aom conAicts of
interest and/or self-serving behaviors on the part o f agents. The Arst is to purchase
information about the agents' efforts; the second is to link incentives to agents' outcomes
(i.e., performance).

Firm Size and Executive CompensaAon
Previous empincal studies generally And a sAong relationship between Arm size and
executive pay. Two commonly used proxies for Arm size are sales volume (Jensen &
Murphy. 1988; Newman & Bannister, 1998) and Arm's total assets (Baumol. 1959:
Marris. 1963; Sndharan. 1996; Ueng, 2000).
Jensen and Murphy (1988) suggest that the compensaAon/sales elasticity for Ave years
and for Ave industry groups has been remarkably stable across Ame and industnes.
Moreover, the correlaAon between size and compensation is very high.
Murphy (1988) shows that when holding the value of the Arm constant, a Arm whose
sales grow by 10 percent w ill increase the salary and bonus of its CEO by between 2 and
3 percent. This Anding suggests size/pay relaAon is causal, and therefore reAects more
than a matching o f CEOs to Arms on the basis o f their abilities. It also suggests CEOs
can increase their pay by increasing Arm size, even when an increase in size reduces a
Arm's market value.
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Tosi et al. (1996) And that Arm size accounts for 54 percent of variance in CEO p a \.
Sridharan (1996) suggests a positive relationship between CEO compensations and the
book value of a Arm's assets. Baumol (1959) and Marris (1963) And that managers are
motivated to increase corporate power, conAol. and perks by maximizing a Arm's size.
While most studies to date have examined only large companies, Ueng (2000)
examines determinants of CEO pay for small as well as large Arms. Evidence in this
study suggests that CEO pay in large Arms is mostly a function o f CEO inAuence over
the board o f directors, as well as Arm size and performance. Firm size is a pnmary factor
in determining CEO pay within small Arms.

Compensation/ Firm Performance RelaAonship and Financial Ratios
Research on top management compensaAon over the past 70 years has yielded more
than 300 studies (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman. 1997). Among these, the most Aequently
researched topic has been the relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm
performance. A positive relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm performance
would be consistent with agency theory, the dominant paradigm in this sAeam of research
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Studies examining the relationship between
performance-based compensation components and improved firm performance that have
been measured using accounting variables have produced conAicting results.
Some studies have shown that accounAng-based compensation components motivate
managers to make decisions that increase their own wealth, but that do not improve Arm
performance (Healy, 1985: Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Lambert & Larker, 1987). Other
studies have shown a signiAcant relationship between improvements in accounting
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variables and increased executive compensation (Ely. 1991; Avowd. 1990; Duru &
Iyengar. 1999; Joyce. 2001). Despite conAicting results among past studies, companies
continue to use accounting based measures of performance in compensation conAacts
(Mercer et al.. 1997). Greater usage of accounting-based performance measures ma) be
seen in future compensation contracts.
Regarding accounting measures of performance used in execuAve compensation
literature, however, many scholars have pointed out a common weakness: most such
studies studies have considered only one accounting measure o f performance, and have
viewed this measure as equally important across Arms (Duru & Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier.
2000).
In the following section, empincal evidence Aom both sAong and weak relationship
studies is presented. Accounting measures of performance and other conAol measures
are also descnbed. Scholars typically use proAtability, stock performance, or
stockholders equity to measure company performance (D yl. 1988; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia.
1994). ProAtability is usually measured as EPS or ROA. Stock performance is usually
measured by changes in stock prices. Stockholder's equity (ROE) is oAen used as a
measure of company performance. The annual return on assets (ROA) is used to measure
the performance of each individual year within the sample.
Duru and Iyengar (1999) investigate the association between a broad specAum of Arm
performance measures and CEO compensation components for the elecAic utility
industry. They adopt market returns (SR); return on assets (ROA); earnings per share
(EPS); operaAng cash Aow per share and growth in sales (SG). Results of their study
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suggest a positive association between changes in compensation and changes in Arm
performance.
Agrawal (1991) analyzed effects of pooled time-senes cross-sectional regressions of
growth in compensation on performance measures, and found cash compensation
positively related to both shareholder return and sales growth. Joyce (2001) researched
executive compensation and Arm performance for a sample o f publicly traded banks and
savings and loans. Joyce used ROA and CEO individual related variables including
tenure and stock ownership. Results of this study indicate a positive correlation between
compensation and ROA and CEO individual related variables. Lobingier (2000)
examined the relaAonship between Arst-time performance plan adoption and Arm
performance, measured over 20 years across 9 industry groups. As a general
performance measure, ROE is applied to all 9 industries, and industry-speciAc measures
used for each. Results indicate industry-speciAc measures provide more sensitive
measurements o f Arm performance than do general performance measures.
Newman & Bannister (1998) examine corporate compensation structures by
invesAgating how the ratio of CEO compensation to average non-CEO employee
compensation varies across Arms/ industries. The ratio is found to vary with
performance. Arm size, and the industiy itself. This study employs ROE and stock
market return (SR) to measure Arm performance, and uses the log o f sales as a measure
of size. Ueng (2000) examines impacts of CEO inAuence over boards of directors on
CEO pay for large and small Arms. Additionally, other determinants of CEO pay for
large and small Arms are examined using ROA, SG (growth rate in sales), and TA
(LOGAST, the natural logarithm o f a Arm's total assets). Results suggest CEO inAuence
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over boards of directors regarding CEO pay is the key factor within larger Arms, and that
Arm size itself is the pnmary determinant within smaller ones.
Other researchers, using different sets of data, measurements of variables, statistical
techniques, and model speciAcations have oAen found weak or even statistically
insigniAcant relaAonships, however, between pay and performance (Jensen & Murphy.
1990). Hirschey & Pappas (1981), for instance. And a negative association between
accounting income and CEO cash compensation. And Ciscel (1977) discovers a weak
correlation between cash compensaAon and both sales and proAts. Garen (1994)
reinforces the idea of the insigniAcance of this relaAonship by noting that the overall
explanatory power of the empincal model for pay-perfbrmance sensitivity is low.
More recently, in a factor analysis of execuAve compensation literature, Tosi. Werner,
Katz & Gomez-Mejia (1998) fbund that less than 5 percent o f CEO pay appeared to be
explainable by performance factors.
The table below summarizes Anancial ratios used in previous studies on the
relationship between CEO compensaAon and Arm performance. These financial ratios
served as the basis for the selecAon of ratios used in this study.
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Table 1.
Financial Ratios Used in Previous Studies

Variable

Studies

ROA ( return of total assets)
Jensen and Murphy (1990), C. Joe Ueng (2000)
R O I( return of total investment) Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987)
ROE (return of shareholder's
Lambert and Larker(1987). Abowd (1990). Traichal
equity)
and Gallinger (1995).Jensen and Murphy (1990)
SR ( ly r change o f stock return) Lewellen and Huntsman (1970). Goughian and
Schmidt (1985)
Kerr and Bettis (1987), Abowd (1990). Pavlik et al
(1993), Schaefer (1998)
EPS ( earnings per share)
Gomez-Mejia. Tosi, and Hinkin (1987)
SGR ( ly r sales growth rate)
Sridharah (1996), Daryl N. Winn & John D.
Shoenhair(1988)
Baumol( 1959 ), Masson (1971). Patricia G Lobingier
(2000)
IT ( inventory turnover)
Patricia G Lobingier (2000)
TA ( total assets)
Baumol (1959), Marris (1963), Tosi, et al (1996)
_____________________________ Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997)_____________

Executive Compensation in the Hospitality Industry
There has been criticism claiming excessive pay, unreasonable pay. and inordinate
rising pay in relation to the issue of executive compensation across industries. Hospitality
industry is not an exception for such criticism. However, it is said that the hospitality
industry has long been labeled as one that pays its workers less than do other industries.
Information regarding executive compensation packages also reveals that service
industries provided the lowest average salary, short-term bonuses, and long-term bonuses
among all the industries (Sturman, 2001). Recent study conducted by Sturman (2001)
proves that overall pay is lower in the hospitality industry than in other industries. The
result of his study demonstrates that the hospitality industry paid about the same as other
industries for low-complexity jobs, but hospitality paid about 85 percent o f what other
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industries paid for moderate-complexit)'jobs and 78 percent for high-complexit\' jobs
including top executives.
Unlike in other industries, the academic research on the top executive compensation
has not been conducted in the hospitality industry^ However, there have been some non
scholastic literatures on this topic. General trend on the executive compensation tor each
sector in the hospitality industry is discussed in the fbllo^ving section.
Restaurant
Triarc, franchisor o f the Arby's restaurant chain, paid CEO Nelson Peltz the princely
sum of $25.2 million in 2000, including more than $15 million in restricted stock and
long-term compensations. This package vaulted Peltz to the top of the heap in the
restaurant world, up from No. 3 last year. Peltz's pay came to more than what the No.2
executive. Tricon Global's David Novak, and No.3, McDonald's CEO Jack Greenberg,
received combined.
Much criticism has been offered, however, of the awarding of such generous
executive compensation packages (Kay, 1998). As that study suggests, not only are
CEOs excessively compensated; they also enjoy inordinately high pay hikes compared to
those of other, more average, workers.
Executive compensation consultant HVS conducted Restaurant Business's CEO
compensation study using its "pay-fbr-perfbrmance" index (Mehegan, 1998). This
system weighs compensation against company earnings, sales, stock prices, and other
factors. If an executive scores 100, it means the person has earned his or her pay. Any
score above 100 indicates executive performance above and beyond the call. A score
below 100 suggests the CEO did not in fact earn his or her pay (Mehegan, 1998). O f 97
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executives surveyed by HVS, 48. or roughly half, scored over 100. a decline from the last
year, when 57%of restaurant CEOs earned their keep

Survey says..". 2001 ).

According to HVS 's 1998 survey of the 100 CEOs listed, only 33 had scores above the
cut-off. i.e., 2/3 of CEOs for the biggest publicly traded restaurant companies in the
country did not earn their pay (Mehegan, 1998).
Within the restaurant sector, stock options were the favored incentive-based
compensation for corporate officers in the mid 1990s, since food service stocks were then
favored on Wall Street. As a result, many small companies used option-heavj
compensation packages to draw big-name executives ("Stock options: The favored
incentive". 1993).
For example, Outback Steak is one o f companies that made a successful debut during
that time due to soaring stock prices. However, according to HVS VP Mansbach, stock
options w ill be worth less in the future, since the restaurant sector has been out o f favor
on Wall Street since the mid 1990s (Mehegan, 2001). As a result, bonus incentives have
become preferable options. The Hospitality Compensation Exchange study, conducted by
HVS, further suggests that while stock options remain a long-term incentive to attract top
executives, more restaurant companies are beehng up base salaries, bonuses and benefit
packages to compete for all levels o f talent (Berta, 2001). In other words, the structure of
compensation is changing in the restaurant sector. Another reason for increased
preference for bonuses over stock options is discussed in Restaurant Business ("Cash &
cary", 2001): while stock option bonuses remain an effective way to keep officers
around, it may take years for them to in fact pay off. Thus, boards, not wanting to risk
waiting for options to vest, are looking for more immediate incentives and prizes.
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According to HVS, the executive compensation consultant, in a repeat of last year's
trend, bonuses were the preferred method for rewarding and retaining CEOs of public
companies. Cash incentives were up 18.4% year-over-year, while average salary rose
4%. roughly in line with inflation. Values of stock-option grants, meanwhile, fell by 24%
(Mehegan. 2001).
Casino
As within other industries, the issue o f generous executive compensation within the
casino sector raises questions about links between CEO compensation and company
performance. Only a few decades ago, U.S. gaming had been restricted to Atlantic City,
New Jersey, and to the state of Nevada. Today, however, 48 of 50 states within the U.S.
allow some form of legalized gaming: as many as 21 states even offer Las Vegas style
gaming experiences (Kefgen & Keung, 1999). Moreover, many of today 's casinos
nationwide are complex webs of myriad entertainment options - hotels, gaming,
restaurants, shows, and more (Kefgen & Mahoney, 1996).
With the unprecedented growth within this industry, combined with the new
complexity of casino operation in and of itself, sophisticated and knowledgeable
management teams have become crucial to financial success. In tum. upward pressure on
executive compensation continues (Kefgen & Keung, 1999).
According to a 1997 HVS survey, gaming companies are taking steps to corral
executive pay by tying compensation to company performance. That year, fifty-nine
gaming CEOs met the criteria to be included in the survey, and were then tested by using
its " pay-for-perfbrmance" index. Indices ranged from 1.4 to 206. TTiirty gaming CEOs
ranked above the average rating o f 100; 29 ranked below (Kefgen & Keung, 1997). The
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HVS survey also found that gaming executives out-earned their hotel and restaurant
counterparts by almost 10%, and that executive perks in the casino sector was much more
generous than those within the hotel and restaurant sectors (Kefgen & Mahone)', 1996).
Goebel (2000) confirmed this finding in his article, stating that the general manager of a
typical gaming property may expect to out earn his counterpart at a hotel by a significant
margin. The general manager of a gaming operation doing between $2 and $50 million
annually earns nearly 40% more than a general manager in a 250-500 room hotel. As
sizes and revenues of the respective properties increase, differences become even more
dramatic.
The HVS survey also analyzed compensation for the three primary gaming markets:
Atlantic City; Las Vegas, and Mississippi. Geographically, Atlantic City and Las Vegas
executives earned more than their Mississippi counterparts by a wide margin (Kefgen &
Keung. 1999). GMs in Atlantic City earned 17 percent more than their Las Vegas peers.
The relationship between the size of a casino and executive salaries has also been
found to be significant; an increase in size tends to result in increased compensation
(Kefgen & Mahoney, 1996). In summary, location and size correlate to compensation
levels within the casino sector.
While bonuses remained fairly consistent as a percentage o f base salary, gaming
executives were awarded long-term incentives in record numbers, plus short-term
incentives. Average numbers of stock options awarded gaming executives have
increased in most cases. In 1996, CEOs averaged 197,535 stock option grants, while in
1998 CEOs received an average o f 232,637 (Kefgen & Keung, 1999).
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Hotel
Within the hotel sector, stockholders also often wonder whether CEOs are in fact paid
more than they deserve, and how they justify making these millions. According to the
HVS survey, executives of larger, more complex hotels continue earning the most. Large
convention and resort hotels pay more than their smaller all-suite and extended-stay
counterparts. There remains a wide disparity o f compensation levels for executives
within this industry, depending on the type, class, size and geographical location of their
hotel properties (Kefgen & Mahoney, 1998). Type o f hotel refers to a property's physical
characteristics as well as operation complexity. Complexity ranges from the simplest
extended stay property to the most complex convention property.
The survey confirmed that size was the best predictor of compensation level. The
only exception to that rule was compensation at small luxury resorts and boutique
properties located in city centers (Kefgen & Mahoney. 1998).
Another factor that can substantially affect CEO compensation is geographical
location. Managers in the Mountain/Pacific region and New England/Mid-Atlantic
regions are generally paid more than peers in other areas, due to higher regional hotel
value. The H V I (Hospitality Valuation Index), developed by HVS. is a hotel valuation
benchmark based on occupancy; room rates; local operating performance; projections o f
supply and demand, and capitalization rates (Kefgen & Mahoney. 1997).
Compensation may also be correlated to the characteristics of a location itself. For
example, hotel managers in center city and resort areas earn substantially more than do
peers at hotels along highways or within suburbs.
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A 1996 analysis o f 1996 CEO lodging industiy pay found that stock options were
liberally dispensed. Twenty -one of the 32 CEOs profiled received long-term incentives
in the form of stock options. Many best-paid CEOs ran companies that have been public
for fewer than Eve years. It is more typical of a young company to be aggressive in
granting stock options (Kefjgen & Mahoney, 1997).
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CHAPTERS

DATA AND M ETHODOLOGY

Introduction
This study's objective is to investigate whether CEO cash compensation is linked to a
firm's performance, and also to further identify determinants of CEO cash compensation
within hotel, casino and restaurant sectors. Chapter 3 covers the following areas: data
sources; sampling procedures; variables; models; statistical methodology, and hypothesis
testing. In particular, this chapter w ill focus on discussion of selected variables used in
order to justify adoption of such variables (which have not been used in previous studies).

Data Sources/Sampling Procedures
Data Sources
1. COMPUSTAT (Research Insight)
This study tests Arms within each sector in the hospitality industry listed under
Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC) for hotel (7011), casino (7990), and
restaurant (5812). Sample firms of each sector were obtained from COMPUSTAT.
This study obtained data for all Enancial measures within the sample from
COMPUSTAT. A ll data were collected for calendar years 1995 to 2000, inclusive.

24
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2. www.edgar-online.com
The Edgar website is provided by the Securities Exchange Commission. Infbmiation
on CEO compensation was obtained from corporate proxy statements (DEF 14A)
Eled with the Securities Exchange Commission. Proxy statements include extensive
information pertaining to compensation o f the CEO and the next four highest paid
ofEcers. CEO cash compensation included base salary for Escal years 1995 to 2000.
inclusive, as well as any annual bonuses earned Eom 1995 to 2000. Data of stock
options Eom 1995 to 2000 for dummy variables was also collected Eom corporate
proxy statements (DEF 14A).
3. www.bls.gov/cpi/
Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor)
To insure comparability across years, and to eliminate the factor of effects of inEation
on CEO cash compensation, cash compensation for each year was adjusted with CPI
(Consumer Pnce Index). CPI infbrmaEon for 1995-2000 was obtained Eom the
Bureau o f Labor Statistics.
4. http//Enance.yahoo.com
Annual stock pnces for computaEon of annual percentage change of stock return (SR)
were obtained Eom http// Enance.yahoo.com. Stock pnces were adjusted for
dividends and stock splits.
Sampling Procedures
Among sample Erms for each sector obtained Eom COMPUSTAT, Erms not directly
related to operating hotel, casino, or restaurants, such as slot machine manufacturers.
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supplier companies, or consulEng companies, have been dropped Eom the sample. More
detailed discussion of sampling Erm data E>r each sector is included below.
1. Hotel
The iniEal sample consisted of all hotels within Standard Industnal ClassiEcation
(SIC) code 7011 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT database. AAer excluding
non-lodging operating companies, such as consulEng Erms, the Enal sample was
narrowed to 22 companies.
2. Casino
The iniEal sample consisted of all casino related Erms within Standard Industnal
ClassiEcaEon (SIC) code 7990 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT database. AAer
excluding non-casino operating companies, such as slot machine manufacturers
and consulEng Erms, the Enal sample was narrowed to 25 companies.
3. Restaurant
The initial sample consisted of all restaurant related Erms within Standard
Industnal ClassiEcation (SIC) code 5812 on the 1995-2000 COMPUSTAT
database. AAer excluding non-restaurant operating companies, such as equipment
manufacturers; management service companies; and entertainment complexes, the
Enal sample was narrowed to 61 companies.
Like previous studies (for example, Attaway, 2000; Lobingier, 2000, and Joyce.
2001 ), this study collected mulEple-year observations of sample Erms' relevant Enancial
data Eom 1995-2000. Other previous studies (Newman & Bannister. 1998: Mishra &
Nielsen. 1999:Ueng, 2000) used only single-year observations. MulE-year, rather than
single-year performance measures are used in the present study, however, since these are
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less sensitive to transitory occurrences, and thus may provide more accurate indicators of
CEO performance. Pooling performance data into a four or Eve-year average [as does
the present study] also reduces variability, and provides a more reliable and valid
measure of Erm performance than annual measures (Gomez-Mejia. Tosi. & Hinkin.
1987).
CEO compensaEon data for Erms examined within this study have been obtained from
primary sources in the form of proxy statements. Any Erm with data unavailable on the
Edgar website (www.edgar-online.com. provided by the Securities Exchange
Commission) was excluded Eom the sample. Additionally, data for any given Erm have
been included in the test sample only if data for each dependent and independent vanable
examined are available for at least one year covered by the study.
In general, CEO compensation for the current year (2001) had been determined based
on prior year's perfbrmEince. Therefore, this study uses lagged Enancial firm
performances. For example, CEO compensation for 1996 is matched with a Erm's
Enancial firm performance for 1995. Other variables, such as Enancial condition,
dummy (stock opEons). and Erm size are not lagged, however, since these particular
variables do not affect CEO compensation for the next year. AAer completing all of the
sampling processes, Enal sample sizes for each sector examined were: 53 for the hotel
sector; 77 for the casino sector; and 188 for the restaurant sector.

Vanables
This study's main purpose is to examine determinants of CEO compensation.
Previous studies (Abowd, 1990; Crystal, 1993; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Hallock,
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1998: Schaefer, 1998) have mainly either examined one feature of one accounting
measure, or have used very general performance measures. Another limitation of
previous studies has been that the particular accounting measure chosen for analysis has
been predicted to be equally important for all Erms in the sample regardless of industry
(Duru & Iyengar, 1999; Lobingier. 2000).
Ely (1991), however, considers it crucial to also view diverse features o f a given
industry in the process o f measuring firm performance; all Erms operate differently, and
therefore experience distinct producEon environments.
Lobingier (2000) adopted nine industry groups in his executive compensation study by
using industry-speciEc variables [the hospitality industry, however, is not included in this
particular study]. RepresentaEve raEos used by Lobinger were those most oAen
identiEed by S&P industry analysts, for each industry category, as important to a Erm's
performance. Within consumer product industries, for instance, inventory turnover is
used to measure management efEciency; with consumer tastes continually changing, it is
relatively easy to End one's consumer-based inventory obsolete. AddiEonally, within
these industnes, changes in sales growth are used as measures of success. According to
industry analysts, in order to remain compeEtive, a consumer products industry company
must have increasing sales growth.
Based, then, on raEos used within previous, similar smdies, and on the perceived
importance o f using industry-speciEc variables, nine ratios thought to have substantial
impact on cash compensation in the hospitality industry have been selected as candidate
variables: proEtability; liquidity; leverage; efEciency; growth rate, and market
performance. Accounting and stock returns are used as Erm and market performance
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measures in executive compensation studies (Lambert & Larcker. 1987: Sloan. 1993).
Market performance, however, is considered part of the proxies of Erm performance
within this study, since Erm performance inherently reEects on market perfonnance. and
also since market performance provides a distinct perspective on Erm performance (i.e..
directly Eom the market).
Variables used in this study are classiEed as: dependent variables; Erm performance;
Enancial condiEons; dummy vanables, and control variables by function. Each variable
speciEcation is defined and detailed below.
Dependent variable
Total cash compensation is used as a dependent vanable. For this study. CEO
compensaEon is operaEonalized as total cash compensation. Total cash compensation is
deEned as the sum of annual salary plus bonus. This study thus excludes deferred
compensation beneEts like pensions; proEt sharing plans; stock options, and IRAs. Cash
compensation is adjusted with CPI, both to insure comparability across years and to
eliminate effects of inEation.
To normalize cash compensation and avoid biases provided by outliers, two previous
studies (Attaway, 2000; Ueng, 2000) have used the natural loganthm o f CEO salary plus
bonus. Logarithm transformation has the effect of stretching exEemely small values and
condensing exEemely large values of variables, thus making its relationship to the
dependent variable more linear in a regression analysis (Norusis. 1995). As with these
two previous studies, then, cash compensaEon is similarly log-Eansformed here.
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Independent variables
This study employed proEtability raEo; efEciency ratio: and stock return as Erm
performance measures. Firm performance measures in this study include Eve speciEc
raEos. These are: return on assets (ROA): net proEt margin (NPM ): one-year sales
growth rate (SG); total assets turnover (A TT), and inventory turnover ratio (IT). Within
the restaurant sector, however, inventory is considered more important than total assets in
measuring management efEciency. Therefore, IT rather than A TT is used for this sector.
For Enancial condition measures, this study used three ratios, including long-term debt
to capitalizaEon (LDR) and qiEck ratio (QR). Precisely, EBITDA interest coverage (IC )
is considered a measure of both Erm performance and financial condition, since EBITDA
is another measure of Erm performance, and since interest coverage indicates another
aspect of Enancial condition. Detailed discussions of each variable are offered below.
Firm performance
1. ProEtability
Prior studies on determinants of CEO pay focus mostly on the relationship between
CEO pay and Erm performance, proxied by proEtability raEos (Jensen & Murphy 1990).
Other previous studies (Jensen & Murphy, 1990. Ueng, 2000) End CEO pay closely
associated with a Erm's ROA. The present study employs a Erm's return on assets
(ROA) and net proEt margin (N PM ) as variables measuring the Erm's proEtability.
NPM represents a different aspect o f proEtability, and has thus been added to ascertain
which aspects of proEtability demonstrate the strongest impact on CEO compensation.
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2. Growth rate
This study uses one-year change of sales growth. Previous studies End CEO pay
closely associated with a Erm's growth rate. Sndharah (1996) found a positive
relationship between CEO pay and growth in sales. Winn & Shoenhair (1988). however,
conclude, paradoxically, that compensaEon is negaEvely related to revenue growth rates.
This particular Ending may in fact be taken as support for BaumoTs hypothesis that
managers have nonpecuniary motives to maximize revenues. This particular Ending may
in fact be taken as support for BaumoTs hypothesis that managers have nonpecuniary
motives to maximize revenues.
3. EfEciency
The present study uses asset turnover (A TT) for the hotel and casino sector and
inventory turnover (IT ) for the restaurant sector, respectively, as measures of
management efEciency. Since cost of goods sold (COGS) is a major expense factor
within the restaurant sector, high inventory turnover indicates a manager's efEciency
level in generating sales revenue. Therefore, especially for the restaurant sector. IT is
considered a supenor measure o f management efEciency. Lobingier (2000) used IT to
examine the consumer product industry. In that study, IT was deemed positively related
to compensation. A TT, however, is a newer proxy not considered in previous studies.
Based on the importance o f industry-speciEc variables, A TT is employed for the hotel
and casino sectors, respecEvely, although not the restaurant sector, since it measures
overall efEciency o f management using all assets, including Exed assets such as rooms
and facilities. Since the hotel and casino sectors are Exed asset-intensive industries, bnsk
utility of Exed assets is important to generaEng revenues. A TT, which instead measures
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total assets, is however considered more important than A TT within the hotel and casino
sectors.
Financial conditions
1. Liquidity
This study uses quick ratio (QR), a new proxy not found in previous studies of this
sort, to represent Erm liquidity. The casino sector in parEcular possesses the tendency of
high QR. QR is used within this study to ascertain whether high levels of cash liquidity
used to absorb current liabilities have impact on cash compensation in the hospitality
industry as well
2. Leverage Ratio
The current study uses long-term debt to total capitalizaEon (LTD ) and EBITDA
interest coverage ratio (IC ) to represent a Erm's leverage condiEon. These are two
additional proxies unused in other studies. Like QR, a Erm's leverage condition is
thought to have effect on CEO compensation wdthin the hospitality industry. According
to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is considered a mechanism to conEol agency cost related
to Eee cash Eow. Therefore, using debts may help in reducing agency problems by
providing ample compensaEon. High EBITDA to pay interest is believed to have a
posiEve correlation to compensation. According to Kefgen, president of HVS Executive
Search (1997), growth in EBITDA, rather than net income and ROE. is used as a
performance cntenon to reEect investors' increased interest in EBITDA.
Market performance
One-year stock return is used here as a measure of market performance. Lewellen &
Huntsman (1970) theonzed that stock performance relates to company performance, and
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also found equity market values to be a major factor in the determination of corporate
executive compensaEon levels. Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) also used stock reEim as a
variable in their study. Kerr & BeEis (1987) explored this same relationship by analyzing
annual stock returns.
Control variable
CEOs of larger companies tend to be beEer compensated than CEOs of smaller ones.
Three previous studies (Ciscel & Carroll. 1980; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman 1997;
Finkelstein & Hambnck, 1989) show CEO compensaEon closely correlated to Erm size.
Firm size has therefore been conEolled within the present study. To measure firm size,
Mishra & Nielsen (1999) use the logarithm of total assets. This smdy also employs a
Erm's total assets (LOGAST, the natural logarithm of a Erm's total assets).
Empincal Endings suggest a size/pay relationship causal, and therefore reEective of
more than a matching o f CEOs to Erms based on ability. These Endings also show CEOs
tend to increase their pay with increased Erm size, even when a size increase reduces a
Erm's overall market value.
Dummv vanable
This also study uses a dummy variable to determine whether companies offering stock
opEons tend also to pay less cash compensation. The dummy variable is coded "1 " for
Erms providing stock options in addition to cash compensation, and "0" for Erms not
providing stock opEons plus cash compensation. I f the dummy vanable is posiEve and
signiEcant, this indicates that companies offering stock options tend to give higher levels
of cash compensation, while companies that do not offer stock options give lower ones.
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Model
Multiple regression models were established for the present study to identify
determinants of CEO cash compensation. CEO compensation was selected as the
dependent variable (Y ) to be predicted by variables representing Erm performance;
Enancial conditions, and firm size, as well as the dummy variable. The same regression
is run separately for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors. The regression model
consists of the following:
Annual cash CEO compensaEon
= bo + b|* ROA + bz *N P M + bs * QR + b4 * SG + b^ * LTD + b6*EIC +
b? *A T T / IT + bg * SR + b9 * TA + b,o * D U M M Y
where bo = constant of the regression equation
b|, bz, b], b4 . b;, b&, b?, bg, bp, and b,o = coefEcient of ROA, NPM. QR.
SG, LTD, IC, A TT/IT, SR. TA. and D U M M Y
Ten variables within the model consist of 1) Erm performance (ROA, NPM , SG, SR.
and A TT/ IT); 2) Enancial condiEons (QR, 1C, and LTD); 3) control variable (TA); and
4) the dummy variable (stock option). For the restaurant sector, inventory turnover (IT )
is used instead of asset turnover (A TT) as a proxy of a Erm's management efEciency
because inventory is a beEer measurement o f management efEciency than is total assets
within that sector. A disEnct relationship between each variable and CEO compensation
is hypothesized here in order to aEempt to prove various (perceived) determinants of
CEO compensaEon.
This study also expects to discover a positive relationship between CEO effectiveness
and Erm performance, thus justifying greater Enancial rewards for CEOs. It is therefore
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important to identify' all factors determining the relative importance of CEO
compensation. To examine the determinants of CEO cash compensation on the basis of
selected variables in the above model, it is hypothesized that:
Null Hvtwtheses
Ho:

Each coefficient of variables in the model is not correlated with cash
compensation for firms in the hospitality industry.
(hi - 0)
b], bz, b3 , b4 , b;, bg, b?, bg, b9 , and bio - coefficient of ROA, NPM , QR,
SG, LTD, IC, A T T /IT , SR, TA, and D U M M Y
Alternative Hvnotheses

Ha:

Each coefficient of variables in the model is correlated with cash
compensation for firms in the hospitality industry.
(hi :^0)

1. The coefficient of ROA is positively correlated with cash compensation for
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bi>0)
2. The coefEcient of NPM is posiEvely correlated with cash compensation for
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bz > 0)

3. The coefEcient of QR is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms
in the hospitality industry.
(b] >0)
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4. The coefEcient of SG is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms
in the hospitality industry.
(b4 >0)
5. The coefEcient o f LTD is negatively correlated with cash compensation for
firms in the hospitality industry .

(bs <0)
6. The coefEcient of IC is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms
in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)

7. The coefEcient of A TT is positively correlated with cash compensation for
Erms in the hospitality industry.
(b? >0)
8. The coefEcient o f IT is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms
in the hospitality industry.
(b? >0)

9. The coefEcient o f SR is positively correlated with cash compensation for Erms
in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)

10. The coefEcient of Erm size is positively correlated with cash compensation
for Erms in the hospitality industry.
(bg >0)

11. The coefEcient of the dummy variable is negatively correlated with cash
compensation for Erms in the hospitality industry.
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(b,o<0)
The same hypothesis is tested for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors,
respectively. For testing the hypothesis, if the coefEcient o f a variable is signiEcant as
stated direction in the alternative hypothesis, its null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that
the variable is a determinant of CEO cash compensation.

StatisEcal Methodology and Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis in this study was tested using both multiple regression analysis and
correlation analysis (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Kerr & BeEis; 1987; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1990; M iller, 1995). Multiple regression models are used to investigate the
relationship between CEO cash compensaEon and Erm performance, and to further
examine the determinants of CEO compensaEon. The same regression is run separately
for each of the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors.
The term multicolinearity refers to the linear relaEonship between independent
variables. Its presence can make a multiple regression model unreliable. To detect a
potential problem with mulEcolineanty, tolerance and V IF values are calculated in this
study. A high tolerance indicates liEle colinearity, and tolerance values approaching zero
indicate that the variables are almost totally accounted for by other variables. The
variance inEation factor (V IF ) is the reciprocal o f the tolerance value. Therefore, small
V IF values would be an indication of low intercorrelation among variables (Hair et al.,
1995).
To check senally correlated or auto-correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test is
conducted in this study. One assumption o f regression analysis is that the residuals for
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consecutive observations are uncorrelated. If true, the expected value of the DurbinWatson statistic is 2. Values of less than 2 indicate posibve autocorrelation, a common
problem in time-series data. Values greater than 2 indicate negative autocorrelation.
For data normality concerns, cash compensation and total assets were transformed b\'
taking their base 10 logarithms, since these two variables reveal departure from the
diagonal line, indicative of a departure from normality (skewness). These logarithms
were subsEtuted for the onginal values in this analysis. The Eansfbrmed variables can be
used with the assurance that they met the assumpEons for normality (Hair et al., 1995).
Since the ultimate objective is to identify determinants of compensation in a model
that has the greatest explanatory power, this study uses backward elimination in running
the regression in SPSS to obtain an opEmal model. Backward elimination is a variable
selection procedure for which all variables are entered into the equation, and then
sequentially removed. I f it meets the cnteria for elimination, it is removed. AAer the
Erst variable is removed, the remaining variable within the equation that has the smallest
partial correlation is next considered. The procedure ends when there are no variables in
the equation that saEsfy the removal cntena. The same regression was run separately for
both the casino and restaurant sectors
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Introduction
In Chapter 3, research methodology and data collection were discussed. This chapter
w ill present the results and Endings of this study. The chapter is organized as follows:
1. DescripEon of Sample
a.

DescnpEve StaEsEcs for CEO cash compensaEon

b.

DescnpEve StaEsEcs for Variables

2. Hypothesis TesEng
c.

Tests of regression vanables.

IiEtially, the descripEve staEsEcs of the smdy are offered to provide an overview of
the data set. Then, the results generated by the mulEple regressions using backward
eliminaEon for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sector respectively w ill illustrate the
relaEonship between cash compensaEon and variables selected in the model, and further
idenEfy factors in the determinaEon of CEO cash compensaEon.
The results of the mulEple regression demonstrate adjusted R Square, Durbin-Watson
(DW ), Tolerance, V IF , t values, the staEsEcal signiEcance of independent variables,
selected variables out of onginaUy employed ten variables in the model.

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

Description of Sample
DescripEon of Cash Compensation
In order to see the changes o f cash compensation for three sectors by year, the cash
compensation is demonsEated separately for each sector. Compensation data for year
2000 is not presented, due to very limited data availability.

Table 2
Descnntive StaEsEcs for CEO Cash CompensaEon of Hotel
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Mean
$474,487
$489,722
$620,633
$475,097
$580,009

SD

Median

Minim um

Maximum

$398.000
$373,054
$699,537
$407.269
$453,918

$429,312
$438.999
$359,892
$359.370
$427,296

$36.000
$100.000
$52,500
$146.020
$172.098

$1 .496 ,000
$1 ,650 ,620
$2,957^,500
$1 .951 .300
$1 .973,,884

The mean of CEO compensation of the hotel sector has gradually increased year by
year except during 1998, with an average annual increase of 7.125%, while the average
annual increase of median is only 0.75%. This indicates that there is not much increase
of compensation in the overall hotel sector. Among the 22 sample Erms, Starwood
Hotels & Resorts (H O T) had the greatest CEO compensation of $2,957,500 in 1997.
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Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics for CEO Cash Compensation of Casino
Year

Mean

SD

Median

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

$596,017
$518.158
$634,475
$768,674
$1,086,720

$393.628
$403,798
$516,874
$538.795
$986,308

$583,333
$382.055
$479,835
$654.591
$729,549

Minim um
$91.985
$65.423
$70.000
$87.308
$27,000

Maximum
$1 .574.,137
$1 .500.,000
$1 .996.,500
$1 .996.,500
$4.007.,693

The mean of CEO compensation for the casino sector has gradually increased year by
year except during 1996, with an average annual increase of 17.98%. The average annual
increase of median is 9.74%. This indicates there is some increase of compensation in
the overall casino sector. M r. Arthur Goldberg of Park Place Entertainment (PPE)
received the greatest cash compensation of $4,007,693 in 1999. 1999 is the only
available year in the proxy statements of PPE. Thus, the relatively huge jump of mean of
1999 may be explained by a single huge data of 1999 cash compensaEon of PPE.

Table 4.
Descnntive Statistics for CEO Cash Compensation of Restaurant
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Mean
$409.788
$452.206
$481,027
$598,934
$607,248

SD
$388,170
$458.658
$564,116
$712,703
$692,978

Median
$293,105
$298,843
$270,000
$340,000
$336,023

Minim um
$1,995
$1.996
$1,997
$1.998
$1.999

Maxim um
$2.,100.,925
$2.,048.,475
$3.,073.,294
$3..600..000
$3..330..000

The mean of CEO compensation for the restaurant sector has gradually increased year
by year with an average annual increase o f 10.65%, while the average annual increase of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

median is 3.98%, indicating some increase o f CEO cash compensation in the restaurant
sector. The median in 1997 dropped to 270,000. This year. CEO compensation of the
100 best-compensated CEOs in the restaurant sector showed veiy respectable year-to
year increases by 13.2% among the highest-paid CEOs. But real action was in the
generous granting of stock options (RafGo, 1997).
As to the greatest CEO compensation, Tricon Global Restaurants was ranked top for
the consecutive two years of 1998 and 1999, beating the previous winner. MacDonald's.
However, through further examination o f the data, it was found that MacDonald's had
increased its stock options in relation to the moderate salary rate over years.
Description of variables

Table 5.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables o f Hotel
Variable
Dummy
ROA
NPM
SR
SG
LTD
IN T CO
QR
A TT
TA($m il)

Mean
0.611
3.2246
6.206
10.689
63.8674
52.0684
7.9309
1.0388
0.7176
$1,161.94

SD
0.492
4.214
9.9197
74.2798
138.1372
24.2213
21.6123
1.3123
0.5713
$1,973.22

Median

Maximum

Minimum
1

0

3.055
4.669
-3.4395
15.775
51.4725
2.8265
0.694
0.5245
$357.31

-10.718
-26.31
-65.907
-66.72
0
-21.846
0.24
0.124
$10.03

]
14.957
34.676
440
850.3
99.307
125.5
8.569
2.481
$7,826.00

Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample
of 22 hotels with 53 observations from 1995 to 2000. As would be expected, some very
wide variations exist for some o f the variables, as indicated in Table 5. For example,
percentage change o f one-year stock return (SR) has an average o f 10.7%, with a
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standard deviation of 74.3%. Similarly, the one-year sales growth rate (SG) has an
average of 63.9%, with a standard deviation of 138.2%. These variations reveal
significant differences between the largest and the smallest values. The total asset size of
the firm is widely spread from $10.03 million to $7,826 million, with an average firm
size o f $1,162 million. The largest is 780.25 times the size of the smallest.

Table 6.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Casino
Variable
Dummy
ROA
N PM
SR
SG
LTD
IN T CO
QR
ATT
TA ($mil)

Mean
0.4487
0.2339
0.6426
-0.3983
26.6188
55.7344
21.3516
1.1778
0.9306
$717.01

SD
0.5005
10.5116
12.1486
56.1001
36.5475
26.8581
121.2091
1.1798
0.6299
$876.53

Median

0
1.4865
2.588
-16.767
15.345
59.314
2.7065
0.8215
0.7695
$323.03

Minimum

0
-53.707
-70.674
-80.281
-49.5
0.175
-17
0.084
0.391
$4.41

Maximum

1
20.161
23.204
232.275
171.86
113.301
1050.398
7.628
4.016
$3,869.71

Table 6 summarizes the descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample
of 25 casinos with 77 observations from 1995 to 2000. While the mean of EBITDA to
interest coverage ratio (IC ) is 21.35, the median is only 2.7. The largest ratio of IC
(1050.398) may result in a comparatively higher mean than median. Compared to the
hotel sector, the casino and restaurant sectors show lower NPM by 9.64 times, indicating
these two sectors perform poorly in terms of profitability compared to the hotel sector.
The mean of stock return is -0.39% with the median o f-16.7%, suggesting that overall
stock performance is poor in the casino sector. Total asset size of the firms is widely
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ranged from $ 4.41 million to $3,870 million, with an average firm size of $ 717.02
million. The largest is 877.35 times the size of the smallest.

Table 7.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Restaurant
Variable
Dummy
ROA
NPM
SR
SG
LTD
IN T CO
QR
IT
TA($ mil)

Mean
0.5925
-0.3076
0.6494
1.5992
12.2414
40.8743
22.741
0.4773
66.7847
$652.79

SD
0.4926
15.9424
9.3985
44.7585
22.9037
44.1848
119.3351
0.4625
39.3934
$2,577.94

Median

Minimum

Maximum

1

0

1

3.829
2.353
-4.96
8.5
29.133
7.026
0.338
55.939
$105.33

-95.985
-65.008
-98.895
-44.69
-78.281
-30.559
0.008
8.551
$4.02

27.848
31.547
150.321
152
317.864
1576.923
3.225
201.172
$19,784.40

Table 7 summarizes descriptive statistics of independent variables for the sample of
61 restaurants with 188 observations from 1995 to 2000. Among the three sectors, the
restaurant sector indicates the lowest average of 40.87 % of LTD. Stock return has an
average of 1.59% and a median o f -4.96% with a standard deviation of 44.76%,
indicating comparatively poor stock performance.
Total asset size o f the firm ranges widely from $ 4.02 million to $19,784.4 million,
with an average firm size of $652.79 million. The largest is 4,921.5 times the size of the
smallest, suggesting that the m^ority o f the sample consists of small firms.
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Hypotheses Testing
The hypothesis is tested to examine the determinants of CEO compensation in the
model by using multiple regression analysis.
Regression Analysis
A multiple regression analysis was attempted to examine the determinants of CEO
compensation for each sector. To apply this procedure, CEO compensation was selected
as the dependent variable (Y ) to be predicted by variables representing Erm performance:
Enancial condiEons; dummy variable (stock option), and control variable (Erm size).
Table 8 presents the result o f regression equations estimated to investigate the
determinants of CEO compensation in the hotel sector. Presented in the table are modeladjusted R Square, Durbin-Watson (D W ). the coefEcients of the independent variables, t
values, tolerance and V IE, two statistics for checking multicollinearity. Since the main
purpose of this study is to idenEfy the determinants o f CEO cash compensation, the
modePs explanatory power is important. In an attempt to establish a model that has the
most explanatory power with selected variables, this study used backward elimination in
running the regression in SPSS.
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Table 8
Regression Summan^ for Hotel
Variable

Regression

T Value SigniEcance Tolerance

V IF

CoefEcient
Intercept

424016.97

Firm
performance
Positively
signiEcant (+)
Negatively
signiEcant (-)

A T T ***

182571.3

3.004

.004

.716

1.396

S R ***

-1876.083

-5.14

.000

.339

2.954

IC ***

10497.12

3.711

.001

.369

2.712

L T D **

-3244.929

-2.32

.025

.685

1.459

T A ***

0.000127

7.682

.000

.802

1.247

Dummy*

121003.3

1.963

.056

.954

1.049

Financial
condition
Positively
signiEcant (+)
Negatively
signiEcant (-)

Control
variable
(Erm size)

Dummy
variable
(stock option)

N
Adjusted R

53
0.756

DW

1.381

*
**

=P <. 10
=P <. 05

***

= p < _ 001

Table 8 shows the summary of the Enal model through backward elimination for the
hotel sector. Overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.756
indicates a high proportion of explained variance to the total variance o f the dependent
variable. To test for the impact o f collinearity o f variables in the Enal model, tolerance
and V IF values were calculated. A high tolerance and small V IF values would be an
indication of low intercorrelaEon among variables (Hair et al., 1995). For this analysis.
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all the tolerance values in the model are greater than 0.1. and V IF values are less than 10.
as shown in Table 8. These results indicate that interpretation of the regression
coefEcients should not be affected adversely by multicollinearity (Norusis. 1995).
To check serially correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was conducted in this
study. One o f the assumptions of regression analysis is that the residuals for consecutive
observations are not correlated. For this analysis, a DW value of 1.381 is less than 2,
indicating that there may be posiEve autocorrelaEon. a common problem in time-senes
data. Dummy variables were added to control for the possible impact of time series on
the serial residual correlation. The D W value, however, did not increase.
Among the onginally employed ten selected vanables, four are found to be positively
signiEcant, and two negaEvely signiEcant in the backward selection model. The other
four variables (ROA; NPM; SG, and QR) fail to be the determinants of CEO
compensation in the model of the hotel sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each
variable eliminated in the model is not rejected, illusEating that the coefEcient of each
variable is not correlated with cash compensation.
The relaEonship between CEO compensation and dummy, interest coverage (IC ): total
asset turnover (A TT), and total asset (TA ) are highly signiEcant at the .10, .001, and .001
levels, respectively. The null hypothesis for each of IC, ATT, and TA is rejected,
indicating that each of these variables is positively correlated with CEO cash
compensaEon.
The null hypothesis of dummy is rejected at the .10 level: however, its positive
coefEcient is contrary to the expected negative correlation. This positive coefEcient
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shows that companies offering stock options tend to give higher cash pay while
companies without such ophons tend to give lower cash pay.
The relationship between CEO compensaEon and SR and LTD is found to be
negatively signiEcant at the .001 and .05 levels, respectively. The null hypothesis for
LTD is rejected, indicating that LTD is negatively correlated with cash compensation as
expected. Although SR had been expected to correlate positively with cash
compensation in the alternative hypothesis, the coefEcient of SR was found to be
negative and signiEcant. The negative correlation indicates that CEOs o f hotels with
lower stock returns were not penalized by lower cash compensations. On the contrary,
they actually received more.
More detailed analysis by funcEon o f variables is discussed below:
Firm performance
A set of variables of ROA; NPM; SR; SG; IC and A TT is employed in this study as
measures o f Erm performance. In the hotel sector, A TT is found to be positively
signiEcant at the .001 level. suggesEng that cash compensation is accounted for by
management efEciency rather than by the Erm's proEtability or growth rate in the hotel
sector. However, stock return (SR) as an estimate of market performance shows
negatively signiEcant coefEcient with CEO compensation at the .001 level, indicating
that lower SR does not lead to lower CEO compensation. Although prior studies suggest
that the Erm's market return is posiEvely related to CEO compensation, this study did not
End evidence to support the previous Ending. The example of Trump Hotel may support
the surpnsing Endings of SR in the hotel sector. In 1996, Trump Hotel increased its
CEO pay package by 71 %, despite a more than 70% drop in the share of its stock
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(Binkley & Christina. 1997). Host Marriott Corp is another example. In 1996. Terence
C. Golden. President o f Host Marriott Corp. received 11 percent higher compensation
than the industry midpoint in the Forbes tally, although Host Marriott's total return was
more than 200 percent above the industry median (Behr. 1997). Therefore, these two
examples support the claim that executive compensation is not always tied to stock
performance (Behr, 1997).
Financial conditions
A set of variables of LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures o f a
Arm's Enancial condiEons in an aEempt to examine whether such Enancial condiEons
have any impact on CEO cash compensation. Financial condiEons have not been
examined in previous studies o f CEO compensaEon.
Both IC and LTD are found to be signiEcant, indicaEng that CEO cash compensation
is affected by a Erm's leverage conditions in the hotel sector. As expected in the
alternative hypothesis, EBITDA interest coverage (IC ) shows a positive impact on cash
compensaEon. suggesting high EB ITD A to pay interest tend to lead to high cash
compensaEon. The negative coefEcient of LTD suggests that the more LTD a Erm has,
the less compensaEon it tends to offer, and vice versa. This result supports Endings by
Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for controlling agency cost
related to Eee cash Eow. Therefore, using debts may help in reducing agency problem
by providing ample compensaEon.
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Control variable
The result of a high signiEcant coefEcient of TA is consistent with Endings Eom prior
studies that CEO compensation is positively related to Erm size, indicating that CEOs of
larger companies are beEer compensated than are CEOs o f smaller ones.
Dummv variable
A positively signiEcant coefEcient of dummy variable of the hotel sector indicates
that companies offering stock options tend to give higher cash pay, while companies
without such stock options tend to give lower cash pay. This Ending is supported by
Terry Conley, Senior VP of Cendant Corp. who states that stock options have always
been a major part of the compensation package o f the lodging industry , even during 1988.
when the company's stock value was at its lowest (Walsh, 2001).
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Table 9
Regression Summary for Casino
Variable

Regression T Value SigniEcance Tolerance
CoefEcient

V IF

2.935

Intercept

Firm
performance
ROA*

0.00488

1.899

.062

.703

1.422

A T T **

-0.132

-3.001

.004

.609

1.641

Q R **

0.05581

2.188

.032

.512

1.952

IC *

-0.00206

-1.907

.062

.703

1.422

T A ***

0.327

7.693

.000

.530

1.886

Dum m y***

0.153

3.299

.002

.918

1.09

Positively
signiEcant (+)
NegaEvely
signiEcant (-)

Financial
condition
Positively
signiEcant (+)
Negatively
signiEcant (-)

Control
variable
(Erm size)

Dummy
variable
(stock option)
N
Adjusted R
DW

*
**
***

77

0.727
1.459

= P<. 10
=P<. 05
=P<. 001

Table 9 shows the summary of the Enal model through backward elimination in the
casino sector. Overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.727
indicates a high proportion of explained variance to the total variance o f the model.
Impact of variable collinearity in the Enal model was tested by calculaEng tolerance and
V IF values. For this analysis, all tolerance values in the model are greater than 0.1 and
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V IF values less than 10. which indicates that interpretation of the regression coefficients
in this model should not be affected adversely by multicollinearit)
To check serially correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was performed in this
model. For this analysis, a DW value of 1.459 is lesser than 2, indicating that there might
be positive autocorrelation, a common problem in Eme-series data. Dummy variables
were added to conEol for possible impact of time senes on the serial residual correlation.
The DW value, however, did not increase.
Among the onginally employed ten selected variables, four are found to be positively
signiEcant, and two to be negatively signiEcant in the backward selection model. The
other four variables (NPM; SR; SG. and LTD ) fail to explain the CEO compensation in
the model of the casino sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each o f the variables
eliminated in the model is not rejected, indicaEng that the coefEcient of each variable is
not correlated with cash compensation.
The relationships between CEO compensation (log base 10) and QR; ROA; dummy,
and TA (log base 10) are sigiEEcantly positive at the .05, .10. .001. and .001 levels,
respectively. The null hypothesis for each of QR; ROA, and TA is rejected, indicating
each of these vanables positively correlated with CEO cash compensation. As in the hotel
sector, the null hypothesis of dummy is not rejected. demonsEating that companies
offering stock option tend to give higher cash pay while companies without option tend to
give low cash pay.
The relationship between CEO compensation and A TT and 1C is found to be
negatively signiEcant at the .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Although both A TT and IC
are expected as correlated positively with cash compensation in the alternative
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hypothesis, each coefEcient of A TT and IC is found to be negative. Therefore, each null
hypothesis is rejected, but an opposite alternative hypothesis holds. More detailed
analysis by funcEon o f variables is given below.
Firm performance
A set o f variables of ROA; NPM; SR; SG; IC and A TT is employed in this study as
measures o f Erm performance. In the casino sector, ROA is found to be positively
signiEcant at the .10 level, suggesting that ROA explains cash compensation beEer than
NPM Eom a proEtability aspect. This result is consistent with Endings of previous
studies that ROA is posiEvely coEelated with compensaEon. However, ATT as an
estimate of management efEciency shows negatively signiEcant coefEcient with CEO
compensation at the .05 level, indicaEng that low A TT is associated with high CEO
compensation. This surprising result may be explained by recent increases of total assets
of large casinos Erms in their developments of new mega-resoEs. A TT is affected not
only by total sales, but also by total assets. In recent years, many new mega casino
resoEs have opened. As a result, the increase in total assets in the casino sector outpaced
total sales. Therefore, the negaEvely signiEcant coefEcient of A TT indicates that total
asset explains A TT even beEer than total sales does.
Financial condiEons
A set of variables of LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures of a
Erm's Enancial conditions in an aEempt to examine whether these Enancial conditions
have any impact on CEO cash compensation. In the casino sector, QR is found to be
signiEcant and positive as expected in the altemaEve hypothesis, indicating that the more
ability to pay shoE-term liabilities a Erm has, the more cash compensation tends to be
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paid. This interesting result may reEect the casino sector's general tendency of high QR.
However. IC is found to be negatively correlated with cash compensaEon in contrast to
its alternative hypothesis. This contrary result may indicate that casino Erms that want to
maintain high coverage ability are less likely to lavish cash on executive compensation.
ConEol variable
As in the hotel sector, the result of a positively signiEcant coefEcient of TA is
consistent with Endings of pnor studies that CEO compensation is positively related to
Erm size.
Dummv variable
Like the hotel sector, the casino sector also shows a positively signiEcant coefEcient
of dummy variable, indicaEng that companies offenng stock options tend to give higher
cash pay while companies without such opEons tend to give lower cash pay.
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Table 10
Regression Summary for Restaurant
Variable
Intercept

Regression
CoefEcient

T Value SigniEcance Tolerance

V IF

2.44

Firm
performance
PosiEvely
signiEcant (+)

SR*

0.000589

1.787

.076

.954

1.048

LTD *

-0.000656

-1.763

.080

.976

1.025

T A ***

0.389

19.672

.000

.977

1.023

Financial
condition
Negatively
signiEcant (-)

Control
variable
(Erm size)
N
Adjusted R
DW
*
**
***

188
0.697
1.034

=P <. 10
= P < . 05
—p< QOl

Table 10 shows the summary o f Enal model through backward eliminaEon in the
restaurant sector. Overall regression results are good. Among the three sectors, the
restaurant sector shows the lowest adjusted R Square of 0.697. but still indicates a high
proporEon of explained variance to the total variance of the model. For the analysis of
collinearity o f variables in the model, all o f the tolerance values in the model are greater
than O.l and V IF values are less than 10, indicaEng that interpretation of the regression
coefEcients in this model should not be affected adversely by multicollinearity.
To check senally correlated residuals, the Durbin-Watson Test was performed in this
model. For this analysis, a D W value o f 1.034 is less than 2, suggesting the indication of
a positive autocorrelation, a common problem in time-series data. Dummy variables
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were added to conEol for the possible impact of time series on the serial residual
correlation. The DW value, however, did not increase.
In comparing three sectors of the hospitality industry , the restaurant sector found the
least number of determinants o f CEO compensation in the regression model.

Among

the originally employed ten selected variables, two variables are found to be positively
signiEcant and one negatively signiEcant in the backward selection model. The other
seven variables fail to explain the determinants of CEO compensation in the model of the
restaurant sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis of each o f the variables eliminated Eom
the model is not rejected, indicating that then coefEcients are not correlated with cash
compensaEon.
The relaEonship between CEO compensation (log base 10) and 1Yr stock return (SR).
and total asset (TA ) are positively signiEcant at the .10 and .001 levels, respectively.
Therefore, the null hypothesis for each of SR and TA is rejected, indicating that each of
these variables is positively correlated with CEO cash compensation in the restaurant
sector. This results suppoE Endings in previous studies that each of SR and TA is
positively related with CEO compensation.
The relationship between CEO compensation and LTD, representing a Erm's leverage
ratio, is found to be negatively signiEcant at the .10 level in the model as expected in its
alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the null hypothesis of LTD is rejected, indicaEng that
LTD is negatively correlated with CEO cash compensation. This result indicates that
companies that have a low long-term debt ratio tend to offer more cash compensaEon and
vice versa. More detailed analysis by funcEon of variables is given below.
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Firm performance
A set of variables o f ROA; NPM ; SR; SG; IC and ATT is employed in this study as
measures of Erm performance. In the restaurant sector, the stock return (SR).
representing a Erm's market performance, is found to be staEstically signiEcant at the .10
level. This indicates SR is positively correlated with CEO cash compensation.
Therefore, the result of SR is consistent with Endings Eom prior studies that CEO
compensation is posiEvely related to stock return.
However, ROA; NPM ; SG; IC and A TT are not found in the model, indicating that
each o f these variables is not correlated with CEO cash compensation. This indicates that
proEtability, sales growth, and management efEciency are not determinants of CEO
compensation in the restaurant sector. Only market perf]rmance among variables of Erm
performance is a factor in determination o f CEO compensation
Financial conditions
A set of variables o f LTD; IC and QR is employed in this study as measures of a
Erm's Enancial condition. In the restaurant sector. LTD is found to be signiEcant and
negative at the .10 level, indicaEng that LTD is negatively correlated with cash
compensaEon. This result suggests that if a Erm's capital structure relies more on
borrowed funds, less compensation tends to be paid, and vice versa. This result suppoEs
Endings by Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for conEolling
agency cost related to Eee cash Eow.
ConEol variable
As in the hotel and casino sectors, Erm size is positively related with the
compensation in the restaurant sectors, showing that CEOs of larger companies are beEer
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compensated than are CEOs of smaller ones. The result o f a high signiEcant coefEcient
o f TA at the .001 level is consistent with Endings Eom prior studies that CEO
compensation is positively related to Erm size.
Dummv variable
Unlike in the hotel and casino sectors, dummy variable is not shown in the Enal model
in the restaurant sector, indicating that stock option is not correlated with cash
compensation.
Table 11 summarizes the variables E)und in the model as determinants of CEO cash
compensation by Erm performance; financial conditions; conEol variable, and dummy
variable for the hotel; casino, and restaurant sectors, respectively.

Table 11.
Summary of Variables Found in the Model

Hotel

Casino

Restaurant

Proxy of firm performance
Positively signiEcant (+)
Negatively signiEcant (-)

A T T ***
S R ***

ROA*
A T T **

S R ***

Proxy of financial condition
Positively signiEcant (+)
Negatively signiEcant (-)

Control variable (Arm size)
Dummy variable (stock option)
Adjusted R square
*
= P<. 10
**
= P<. 05
❖
-P < . 001

%(]***
L T D **

Q R **
IC *

T A ***

T A ***

Dummy*

Dum m y***

0.756

0.727
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LTD *
T A ***

0.697

CHAPTERS

SUM M ARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
The issue of top management compensaEon has received widespread attenEon Eom
public concerns, stockholders, and regulating agencies for many years. Research on top
management compensaEon has taken place for more than 70 years. However, despite the
fact that much criEcism has been given about unreasonable pay and inordinately high
CEO pay in the hospitality industry, liEle research on hospitality CEO compensaEon
itself has been done.
The m^or theoreEcal Eamework for researching CEO pay comes Eom agency theory.
Much literature on execuEve compensaEon relies on the intuiEon of the pnncipal-agent
model. In parEcular, there is a presumpEon managers w ill have large pay-performance
sensiEviEes to align their interests with those of their shareholders. A positive
relaEonship between CEO compensaEon and Erm performance would be consistent with
agency theory (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998).
The main focus of this study is to examine determinants of CEO compensaEon among
selected variables for the hotel, casino, and restaurant sectors of the hospitality industry
using mulEple regression analysis.

59
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A sample of 22 hotels (SIC 7011); 25 casinos (SIC 7990): and 61 restaurants (SIC
5812): were collected for analysis for each sector. Taking its cue Eom previous studies
(AEaway, 2000: Lobingier. 2000; Joyce. 2001), this study used multiple-year
observations. The Enal samples of the restaurant, hotel and casino sectors consisted of
53, 77, and 188 observations respecEvely. In order to achieve the objective of identifying
determinants of compensation, this study was much concerned with selection of
candidate factors that might affect hospitality CEO compensaEon.
Ely (1991) emphasized the importance o f industry-speciEc variables in measuring
Erm performance. As such, it is important to consider different features for each sector of
the hospitality industry. One problem with previous studies has been that the particular
accounEng measure has been predicted to be equally important for all Erms in the
sample, regardless of industry (Duru & Iyengar. 1999; Lobingier, 2000). Therefore, this
study expanded the spectrum o f financial raEos to invesEgate determinants of CEO
compensation Eom a Erm's various perspectives, ranging proEtability, growth, leverage,
liquidity, and efEciency. In addition to eight Enancial variables, total assets and stock
options were included as a conEol variable and a dummy variable, respecEvely.
MulEple regression analysis was applied to each sector to develop the compensaEon
predicEon model in order to idenEfy determinants o f CEO compensation. The summary
of results for each sector is demonstrated below.
Hotel
Using backward eliminaEon procedure, six variables Eom the original list of ten were
incorporated into the model for the hotel sector. These identiEed determinants of
compensation were: ATT; SR; IC; LTD; TA, and dummy. ATT; IC; TA, and dummy
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were positively correlated with compensation. The result suggests that management
efEciency to generate sales by using total assets, high coverage ability by ample
EBITDA, and Erm size positively aEect CEO cash compensation in the hotel sector. And
the posiEvely signiEcant coefEcient o f dummy suggests that hotel Erms offenng stock
options tend to pay cash high cash compensation as well.
SR. and LTD were negatively correlated with compensaEon. As expected in the
hypothesis, the negaEve correlation between LTD and cash compensaEon was identiEed.
According to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is regarded as a mechanism for controlling
agency cost related to free cash Eow. W ith high debt leverage, the default risk may deter
a Erm Eom lavishing cash on executive pay and perks.
This study did not End evidence, however, to support Endings o f previous studies that
the Erm's market return is positively correlated with compensaEon. The result of
negaEve coefEcient o f SR indicates hotel Erms pay high cash compensaEons despite poor
market performance of their stocks. This surpnsing Ending was also evidenced by real
examples of Trump Hotel and Host MarrioE CorporaEon, as discussed in Chapter 4.
These results indicate that a high degree of agency problem may exist within the hotel
sector. Hotel CEOs may be pursuing high cash compensaEons to increase their own
wealth, and disregarding wealth decline for hotel shareholders themselves. Therefore,
senous conEicting interests between management and shareholders may exist in the hotel
sector.
Since the purpose of this study is to establish a model to identify determinants of CEO
cash compensation, the model's explanatory power is important. The result demonstrated
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the adjusted R Square of 0.756. which means that 75.6% of the variance in hotel CEO
cash compensation is explained by six variables identiEed in the model.
As to the DW test, dummy vanables were added in an attempt to control tor the
possible impact of Eme series on the senal residual correlation, as indicated by a DW
value of 1.381, but the D W value did not increase. Therefore, autocorrelation may be a
problem in the model of the hotel sector.
Casino
Using backward elimination procedure, six variables Eom the onginal list of ten were
incorporated into the model for the casino sector. These identiEed determinants of
compensaEon were QR; IC; ROA; ATT; TA, and dummy. Except for A TT and IC. four
variables were posiEvely correlated with compensaEon. The result suggests that
proEtability, liquidity and firm size positively affect CEO cash compensation. High
sensiEvity to a Erm's liquidity indicates that the more ability to pay short-term liabilities
a company has, the more cash compensaEon is paid. This interesEng empirical evidence
may reEect a general tendency o f high QR in the casino sector. The absence of SR in the
model reveals the casino sector's insensibility to market performance in the
determinaEon of CEO cash compensation.
As in the hotel sector, the signiEcant coefEcient of dummy suggests that casino Erms
offenng stock opEons tend to pay high cash compensation, too. The surpnsing result that
low ATT is associated with high CEO compensation was explained by recent increases in
total assets in the casino sector, due to openings o f many new mega casinos resorts; that
is, increases in total assets outpaced total sales. While posiEve correlaEon between 1C
and compensation was expected, the opposing result was presented in the model.
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indicating that Erms with higher IC tend to give less cash compensation. This result may
be explained by casino Erms' desire to maintain a high ability of servicing debt. The
desire may have deterred Erms Eom giving extravagant cash bonuses or salaries.
The overall regression results are good. The adjusted R Square of 0.727 indicates a
high proportion o f explained variance to the total vanance o f the dependent variable; that
is, 72.7% o f CEO cash compensaEon is explained by Eiur variables identiEed in the
model.
As to the D W test, dummy variables were added in an attempt to conEol E)r the
possible impact o f time senes on the senal residual correlation, as indicated by a DW
value of 1.459, but the D W value did not increase. Therefore, autocorrelation may be a
problem in the model of the casino sector.
Restaurant
Using backward elimination procedure, three variables Eom the onginal list o f ten
were incorporated into the model E r the restaurant sector. These identiEed determinants
of compensaEon were: SR; LTD, and TA. Except for LTD, two vanables were positively
conelated with compensation. The result suggests that market performance and Erm
size posiEvely affect CEO cash compensation in the restaurant sector. This Ending is
consistent with previous studies that found a positive relationship between CEO
compensation and market performance and Erm size. The result of negaEve coefEcient
of LTD as expected in its alternative hypothesis indicates that restaurant Erms tend to pay
less if Erms' capital structure relies more on borrowed funds and vice versa. High
sensitivity of restaurant CEO cash compensation to debt leverage supports the Ending of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

the study conducted by Jensen (1986) that debt leverage is regarded to be a mechanism
lor conEolling agency cost related to Eee cash Eow.
The result demonsEated the adjusted R Square of 0.697. which means that 69.7% of
CEO cash compensaEon is explained by three variables identiEed in the model.
However, regarding the DW test to check senally correlated residuals, the value o f DW
was found to be comparatively low at 1.034. Dummy vanables were added in an aEempt
to conEol E»r the possible impact of time series on the senal residual correlation;
however, the DW value did not increase, suggesEng autocorrelation is a problem in the
model o f the restaurant sector.

Implications of the Study
Based on the Endings, this study oEers E)ur impoEant implications E)r the hospitality
industry. First, the results of regression analysis at least partially suppoE agency theory
in the hotel, casino and restaurant sectors by demonsEating that Erm perErmance (ATT;
ROA and SR respectively) is highly correlated with CEO compensation with the highadjusted R Square of .756, .727, and .697 respectively. Compared to the adjusted R
squares found in previous studies, this study shows a much higher explanatory power.
Here are some examples. Ueng (2000) found the adjusted R Square of .2440 for small
Erms and .2132 for pooled firms. Attaway (2000) found the adjusted R Square of .2928
for the computer and elecEonics industry. Joyce (2001) showed the adjusted R square of
.41 for publicly traded banks and savings.
Second, the negaEve correlaEon between cash compensation and LTD found in the
hotel and restaurant sectors demonstrate their high sensiEvity to a Erm's leverage
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condition. According to Jensen (1986), debt leverage is regarded to be a mechanism for
controlling agency cost related to Eee cash Eow. With high debt leverage, the default risk
may deter a Erm Eom lavishing cash on executive pays and perks. Therefore, using
debts may help in reducing agency problem by providing ample compensation in the
hotel and restaurant sectors.
Third, in that the hotel sector is a Exed asset intensive industry, A TT is expected to
have an impact on CEO compensation in the selecEon of variables because ATT
measures management's efEciency of uElizing total assets including Exed assets. As
expected, the hotel sector shows posiEvely signiEcant correlation between CEO cash
compensation and management efEciency (A TT) at the .001 level; this may suggest that
hotel CEOs with high cash compensaEon are more likely sales revenue than proEtonented. Therefore, raising cash compensaEon may motivate CEOs to maximize sales
revenue.
Fourth, this study found the indication of agency problem in the hotel sector by the
negative coefEcient of SR, illustrating that hotel Erms pay high compensation despite
poor market performance of their stocks. This surpnsing Ending was also evidenced by
real examples in Chapter 4. Hotel CEOs may be pursuing high cash compensaEon to
increase their own wealth, disregarding wealth decline for hotel shareholders. There may
be serious conEicEng interests between management and shareholders in this sector.

Suggestions for Future Study
For future study of CEO compensaEon and Erm performance in the hospitality
industry, six points are discussed below. First, one limitation o f this study is that its
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sample was drawn Eom a population of publicly traded Erms only. Findings could differ
if the sample size were expanded to include pnvately held companies.
Second, in addition to Erm performance variables. CEO-related non-Enancial factors
need to be included in future studies, since CEO compensation is also accounted for by
non-Enancial factors. These may include age, job tenure, ownership, and education. By
accounting for these other effects, future studies w ill sEengthen the test of compensation
study.
Third, this study did not investigate deferred forms of compensation, such as stock
options and other long deferred forms of compensaEon. Although previous studies
(Lewellen & Huntsman, 1970) have shown cash compensaEon an acceptable substitute
for more comprehensive measures of composition, this may not be true in the hospitality
industry due to changes in compensation practices. A more comprehensive measure of
compensation, such as stock opEons, pension beneEts, stock bonuses. proEt sharing, and
deferred pay could provide valuable insight into factors in the determination of CEO
compensation.
Fourth, according to Kefgen & Mahoney (1998), there conEnues to be a wide
disparity of composiEon levels for executives, depending on the type, class, size and
geographical location of their hotel properEes. Therefore, an analysis for hotel Erms
grouped by type, class, size and geographical location would provide better insight into
executive compensation within the hotel sector.
FiEh. as discussed in Chapter 4, the overall sectors show somewhat high variation in
terms of Erm size. In parEcular, the restaurant sector reports that the largest is 4,921.5
times larger than the smallest. Even within the same sector, the effect of compensaEon
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on firm performance and determinants of compensation may not indicate a consistent
result according to firm size. Therefore, an analysis for firms grouped by size within the
same sector could provide better insights about the effects of cash compensation on firm
performance and sector-specific determinants o f compensation.
Sixth, this study focuses on CEO cash compensation only. Since the hospitalit}'
industry is a labor-intensive industry, it would be interesting to expand the scope to
include senior executives, and the middle and low-level managers in charge of daily
operations. By expanding the scope of management level, the study could compare the
impact of cash compensation of each level o f managers on firm performance to see which
level o f management is best motivated to improve firm performance by offering
compensation. Also, the study could examine whether there are differences in terms of
factors in the determination of compensation by level of management.
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